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I. INTRODUCTION
Two young fish are swimming along together.  They suddenly come upon 
an older fish, who in passing says to them, “Morning, boys.  How’s the water?”1
The young fish swim hurriedly past, each looking confused.  Leaving the older 
fish behind, one turns to the other and asks, “What the hell is water?”2
So begins David Foster Wallace’s commencement address to the 2005 
graduating class of Kenyon College, the point of which was “merely that the 
most obvious, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and 
talk about.”3  The irony of the parable and its poignant truth reaches a more 
global resonance when considered in light of the United States’ most obvious, 
1. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THIS IS WATER: SOME THOUGHTS, DELIVERED ON A SIGNIFICANT
OCCASION, ABOUT LIVING A COMPASSIONATE LIFE 3 (2009). 
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 8.
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628 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:627 
though least discussed crisis in history: the depletion of our freshwater re-
sources.4  Alarmingly, in the next fifty years the United States will face not just 
drought, but complete dissemination of readily accessible water resources in 
areas ranging from its breadbaskets5 to its commercial and financial epicenters.6
As these lakes, reservoirs, wells, and aquifers drain, the communities that de-
pend upon them will seek alternative and further-reaching water sources into 
which they can dip their proverbial straws.  The most alluring and perhaps the 
most vital of these sources are the Great Lakes. 
In recognition that such straws may descend and that “Future Diversions 
and Consumptive Uses of Basin Water resources have the potential to signifi-
cantly impact the environment, economy and welfare of the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River region,” the region surrounding the Great Lakes championed 
for effective protections of Great Lakes waters.7  The Great Lakes–St. Law-
rence River Basin Water Resources Compact (the “Great Lakes Compact” or 
the “Compact”), signed into effect in 2008 by President George W. Bush after 
being adopted in all eight states that border the lakes, as well as the two Cana-
dian provinces to the north, is a legally-binding, international water compact 
that attempts to manage withdrawals out of the Lakes by creating a blanket 
prohibition on diversions outside of the Great Lakes Basin.8  However, this 
stringent provision makes way for three important exceptions: the intrabasin 
transfer exception, the straddling community exception, and the straddling 
4. See Dennis Dimick, If You Think the Water Crisis Can’t Get Worse, Wait Until the Aquifers 
Are Drained, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 21, 2014, http://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/news/2014/08/140819-groundwater-california-drought-aquifers-hidden-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/CJ5Q-DUAE].
5. A 2013 Kansas State University study determined that if Kansas farmers continued irrigating 
crops and watering livestock from the Ogallala aquifer at the current rate, in fifty years the aquifer 
would fall sixty-nine percent below its current level. See David R. Steward et al., Tapping unsustain-
able groundwater stores for agricultural production in the High Plains Aquifer of Kansas, projections 
to 2110, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. E3477, E3477 (Aug. 26, 
2013); see also Roxana Hegeman, High Plains Aquifer will be 69 percent depleted in 50 years, K-State 
study says, WICHITA EAGLE, Aug. 26, 2013, http://www.kansas.com/news/article1121517.html#story-
link=cpy [https://perma.cc/XA74-3YVE].  This figure is staggering, as the aquifer lies underneath 
more than eight Great Plains and its waters supports a fifth of all irrigated crops produced in the coun-
try. See SANDRA POSTEL, WATER: RETHINKING MANAGEMENT IN AN AGE OF SCARCITY 20 (1984).
6. See Daniel Griffin & Kevin J. Anchukaitis, How Unusual Is the 2012–2014 California 
Drought?, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 8673, 9017 (2014); Matt Stevens, California drought most 
severe in 1,200 years, study says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-california-drought-worst-20141205-story.html [https://perma.cc/CCY8-SVFS]. 
7. Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110–342, § 
1.3, 122 Stat. 3739, 3742–43 (2008) [hereinafter Federal Compact]; see also WIS. STAT.
§§ 281.343(1m) (2013–2014). 
8. S.J. Res. 45, 110th Cong. (2008) (“[e]xpressing the consent and approval of Congress to an 
interstate compact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin”); see also
Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.8.
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county exception, all of which allow diversions to communities on the fringes 
of the basin.9
While the Great Lakes Compact seeks to protect waters threatened by di-
versions, in reality far-flung communities like those in Las Vegas or Arizona 
do not immediately threaten the Great Lakes because the cost of a pipeline 
would be so expensive.10  Rather, the most immediate threats to the Compact’s 
purpose are communities just outside of the basin.  Enter the City of Waukesha, 
Wisconsin: a town faced with its own unique water crisis and armed with a 
short, but historically and legally significant straw.11  Less than twenty miles 
outside of Wisconsin’s largest city, Waukesha lies in a county that straddles the 
basin divide,12 and thus was in a geologically fortunate position to apply for a 
diversion.13  Waukesha had struggled for years with overdraft issues, eventually 
leading to a contamination of the groundwater supply the water utility provided 
to its own citizens and those in neighboring communities with radium, a radio-
nuclide that can cause cancer.14  After years struggling to petition the Great 
Lakes Council to approve a diversion of Great Lakes water to the thirsty com-
munities, Waukesha alone was finally afforded one pursuant to the Compact’s 
diversion processes on June 21, 2016.15
The approval was limited to the City of Waukesha and those “town islands” 
located just outside its municipal boarders only, leaving the neighboring com-
munities the water utility served without access to the diversion waters.16  This 
narrowing of the service areas to the municipal boundaries of the City of 
Waukesha was contrary to Wisconsin’s adaptation of the compact, which dif-
fers significantly in its definition of “community.” Where the Federal Compact 
9. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9. 
10. In fact, the cost of ocean water desalination would likely be cheaper.  Mark Brush, Here are 
2 reasons why the drought in California won’t open the door to Great Lakes water, MICH. RADIO, Apr. 
23, 2016, http://michiganradio.org/post/here-are-2-reasons-why-drought-california-wont-open-door-
great-lakes-water#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/SA9K-AB7Q](“[F]or states like Arizona, California, 
and even Texas it would be cheaper for them to build desalinization plants—these plants convert 
ocean water into drinking water.”).
11. See PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS 240–49 (2006). 
12. WIS. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, VERSION 1.2, CITY OF WAUKESHA PROPOSED GREAT LAKES
DIVERSION: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 14, i (2015) [hereinafter DIVERSION EIS];
see infra Figure 1. 
13. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3). 
14. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxic Substance Portal–Radium,
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=790&tid=154 [https://perma.cc/83Y9-A7AM] (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2017) (“Exposure to high levels [of radium] results in an increased risk of bone, liver, and 
breast cancer.”) [hereinafter ATSDR CDC Radium Notice]. 
15. Final Decision, In the Matter of the App. By City of Waukesha, Wis. For Div. of Great Lakes 
Water, No. 2016-1 § III(1), Attachment 1 (Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Council June 21, 2016) [hereinafter Approval Decision].   
16. Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5). 
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defines it narrowly as a “city, town, or equivalent thereof,” 17 Wisconsin defines 
it much more broadly, and this broader definition allows for Waukesha’s entire 
service area, even that outside of its municipal boundaries, to be granted access 
to Lake Michigan water.18  These inconsistencies seem to run afoul of the uni-
versal stated purpose of the Compact: to “facilitate consistent approaches to 
Water management across the Basin.”19
These inconsistencies serve to highlight a reoccurring theme in Wisconsin: 
disregard for Compact requirements.  Regardless of the definition of commu-
nity—indeed, regardless of the approval of the diversion itself—state action has 
already been taken in subversion of the Compact, seriously jeopardizing its sta-
tus as the ultimate protector of Great Lakes water.20  The subversion began in 
2015 when the Town of Somers divided itself in half to incorporate the Town 
and Village of Somers.21  Reincorporation effectively made the Village, located 
entirely within the basin divide, Compact compliant.  The Town, however, 
straddled the basin and was supplied with water purchased from the City of 
Kenosha, a similarly situated town on the basin divide just to the south.  As 
both municipalities fell under the “straddling communities” exception to diver-
sions out of the basin, and both would require the expensive and time-consum-
ing undertaking of Compact compliance in order to divert water from Kenosha 
to the Town of Somers. 
However, these processes were effectively avoided in the summer of 2015 
when the Wisconsin legislature enacted Item 66, which almost entirely re-
stricted the Kenosha County Water Utility’s ability to deny water service to 
communities and municipalities along its borders.22  Essentially, Item 66 did 
what Waukesha’s diversion application sought—to extend Great Lakes water 
outside the municipality’s borders—though without the headache of following 
Compact procedures.23
This Comment dives into the history and complexity of the Great Lakes 
Compact and develops the theory that the Compact’s past and present challenge 
its validity and its protective power.  Part II will examine the history of the 
various Great Lakes protection plans that led up to the Great Lakes Compact, 
paying particular attention to how the history of these protection plans may 
17. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
18. See WIS. STAT. § 281.346(4)(e)(em) (2013–2014). 
19. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.3(2)(d). 
20. See generally, Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II.
21. Somers Spring Election Results April 7, 2015; Published on Village and Town of Somers 
(http://www.somers.org [https://perma.cc/Z6C9-FNMM]). 
22. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015). 
23. See id.
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shadow the Great Lakes Compact’s own potency.24  Part III will dissect the 
Compact itself and the key differences between the definition of “community” 
in Wisconsin’s adaption of the Compact and in the Federal Compact language.25
Part IV will develop the road Waukesha traveled on its path to a diversion re-
quest and the analysis the Council adopted in ultimately approving it.26  Finally, 
Part V will examine Item 66 and will apply the Council’s analysis from its de-
cision approving Waukesha’s diversion to determine whether the Town and 
Village of Somers are in fact entitled to the diversions they receive, ultimately 
demonstrating that the 2015 legislative act seriously undermines the potency 
and staying power of the Great Lakes Compact.27
Thus, the historic weakness of federal water protection measures, the ap-
proval of the Waukesha diversion, and ultimately the Wisconsin legislature’s 
circumvention around the Compact all show that while the Great Lakes Com-
pact is a progressive step, it remains a weak protection for the country’s most 
obvious, though least appreciated resource. 
II. THE INITIAL GREAT LAKES PROTECTION PLANS
The abundance of Great Lakes waters coupled with the precariousness of 
the Lakes’ hydrological condition presented a pressing protection problem for 
the United States early in its history.  Efforts for large scale diversions began 
as early as 1840 with the building of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, and 
by mid-nineteenth century Chicago saw conflict when it reversed the flow of 
the Chicago River in order to divert polluted wastewater out of the city, and in 
effect diverted nearly 65 million gallons a day out of Lake Michigan and into 
the Mississippi watershed.28  Efforts to protect the Lakes began to formulate 
shortly thereafter, making the Great Lakes Compact only the latest in a long 
history of measures to protect the Lakes from diversions.29
The first measure to protect the Lakes came about in 1909, when the United 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. See infra Part V.
28. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 (1906) (the Court dismissed without prejudice and 
awarded costs to Illinois after Missouri alleged that the Sanitary District of Chicago would reverse the 
flow of the Chicago River and in effect pollute the Mississippi). 
29. See Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and 
Canada, U.S.–Gr. Brit. (for Canada), Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Treaty with Great Brit-
ain]; Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 11, 1985, http://www.cglslgp.org/media/1366/greatlakescharter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5EG-CEKR] [hereinafter Great Lakes Charter]; DAVID NAFTZGER, The Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact: protecting freshwater and promoting sus-
tainability, in WHOSE DROP IS IT, ANYWAY?–LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING OUR NATION’S WATER
RESOURCES 161, 175–88 (Megan Baroni ed., 2011). 
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States and Canada signed into effect the Boundary Waters Treaty (the 
“Treaty”).30  The Treaty purported to govern all basins shared by the United 
States and Canada and sought to protect the equal rights of both countries for 
use of the waters.31  It limited existing uses to those “uses, obstructions, and 
diversions heretofore permitted or hereafter provided for by special agree-
ment”32 and provided that 
no further uses or other uses or obstructions or diversions, 
whether temporary or permanent, of boundary waters on either 
side of the line, affecting the natural level or flow of boundary 
waters on the other side of the line, shall be made except by 
authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada 
within their respective jurisdictions and with the approval, as 
hereinafter provided of a joint commission, to be known as the 
International Joint Commission.33
This clause gave both the United States and Canada and the International 
Joint Commission34 great control over to whom use of the waters would be 
granted.  However, managing the resource was a unique and complicated en-
deavor and these complexities infected the Treaty with fundamental weak-
nesses.35
For example, the standard articulated above in Article III alleging to protect 
against diversions “affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on 
the other side of the [border]line”36 in fact “offers little practical value.”37  A 
single diversion would not have quantifiable effects on the Lake’s “level or 
30. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29.
31. BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 968 (5th ed. 2013); Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art. VIII (“The High Con-
tracting Parties shall have, each on its own side, equal and similar rights to use of the waters hereinbe-
fore defined as boundary waters.”).  It was not until the years following World War II that the Treaty 
evolved into an environmental protection agreement when “citizens and scientists became increasingly 
alarmed about water pollution in the Great Lakes.”  Noah D. Hall, Boundary Waters Treaty Centennial 
Symposium: Introduction-The Centennial of the Boundary Waters Treaty: A Century of United States-
Canadian Transboundary Water Management, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1431 (2008). 
32. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art. III. 
33. Id.
34. The International Joint Commission, officially “[e]stablished in 1911 to administer and dis-
charge the purposes of . . . Treaty,” works particularly “to assist Canadian and U.S. governments in 
finding solutions to problems related to waters which lie along or flow across the U.S–Canada border.” 
David de Launay, Implementing The Great Lakes Charter Annex Resource Based Decision Making 
Standard in Each Jurisdiction, 5 TOLEDO J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 479, 482 n.13 (2003). 
35. Id. at 486–87. 
36. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art.  III.
37. Hall, supra note 31, at 1440. 
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flow”38 as a result of the sheer volume of Great Lakes water.39  What was 
needed was an accounting of all diversions out of the lakes, which likely would 
lead to conclusions that collective diversions in fact affect levels or flow, but 
no “formal allegations of Boundary Waters Treaty violations” have yet surfaced 
to this effect.40  Additionally, “[w]hile individual withdrawals and diversions 
from tributary rivers and streams often do have a measurable effect on these 
waters, these [types of] waters are not protected under the Boundary Waters 
Treaty.”41
Nevertheless, the Treaty generally helped “limit conflict between the na-
tions over their shared water resources.”42  To more comprehensively control 
diversions out of the Great Lakes, in the 1940s and ’50s, the Basin states began 
to organize efforts to specifically control diversions.43  In 1968, Congress au-
thorized the creation of an interstate compact that created the Great Lakes Com-
mission (the “Commission”).44  The Commission sought to control Basin man-
agement through research, development, and the subsequent implementation of 
protection plans.45  To this end, the Basin’s eight governors and two premiers 
effectuated the Great Lakes Charter of 1985 (the “Charter”).46  The Charter was 
the first international, voluntary agreement that delineated the management pro-
cedure of a shared water resource between the United States and another inter-
national power.47
Signed by the governors and the premiers of the Canadian provinces adja-
cent to the Great Lakes, the Charter purported “to manage diversions out of the 
38. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art.  III. 
39. Hall, supra note 31, at 1440–41. 
40. Id. at 1441. 
41. Id.  Additional conflicts arise out of inconsistencies among states’ common law approaches 
to water law.  As the Treaty covered all waterways between the United States and Canada, its scope 
reached some states or territories following the law of prior appropriation as well as others that follow 
the law of riparianism to manage the shared resources.  As the Treaty did not resolutely delineate how 
these particular conflicts could be resolved, nor did it indicate what system of water management was 
preferable, the resolution of conflicts between states that follow the different doctrines is rich, but 
inconsistent. See id.; see generally GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE
RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2000).  To complicate 
matters more, the resolution of the conflicts between international parties is equally fraught with con-
flicting opinions and outcomes. Id.
42. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 970. 
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lakes as well as consumptive uses of the lakes.”48  Specifically in regard to di-
versions, the Charter required that a state or province provide “prior notice and 
consultation” to the others about any “major” diversions and required the State 
to simultaneously seek the other’s “consent and concurrence” before orches-
trating or otherwise authorizing a diversion.49  Consent was necessary from all 
signing parties for diversion of five million gallons a day or more.50
Preceding and prompting the enactment of the Charter, Sporhase v. Ne-
braska51 introduced the notion that water is in fact an article of commerce ac-
cording to the Dormant Commerce Clause, and that movement of such an arti-
cle across state lines may not be arbitrarily upheld or otherwise discriminated 
against.52  In Sporhase, a provision of a Nebraska state law prohibited the ex-
portation of Nebraska groundwater to any other state without a permit.53  The 
Supreme Court ruled the provision to be arbitrarily discriminatory and further 
held that because Nebraska failed to show a compelling state interest in the 
provision, the provision was invalid on its face.54  While the decision brought 
to light the commercial status and marketability of water, it also brought to the 
surface doubts about a state’s ability to autonomously limit water diversions to 
locations outside of that state.55
In response to Sporhase, the Charter became an agreement between the 
governors and premiers to vest export control of Great Lakes water in them-
selves.56  However, the Charter’s effectiveness proved unreliable.57  Firstly, as 
48. Amanda K. Beggs, Note, “Death by A Thousand Straws”: Why and How the Great Lakes 
Council Should Define “Reasonable Water Supply Alternative” Within the Great Lakes Compact, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 361, 367 (2014).
49. Great Lakes Charter, supra note 29; see also Beggs, supra note 48, at 367–68. 
50. Beggs, supra note 48, at 367–68. 
51. 485 U.S. 941 (1982). 
52. U.S. CONT. art.  I, § 8, cl.  3.
53. Sporhase, 485 U.S. at 957 (“the reciprocity provision operates as an explicit barrier to com-
merce between the two States”). 
54. Id. at 955.  While the Court held that the state’s interest in water conservation was highly 
appropriate and legitimate within an objective sphere, the “burden imposed imposed [by the Nebraska 
statute] on . . . commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id. at 954.  The 
first part of the Nebraska statute upheld the interest and the contested provision was found invalid. Id.
at 955–56.
55. Dana M. Saeger, Comment, The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact: Groundwater, Fifth Amendment Takes, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 12 GREAT PLAINS
NAT’L RES. J. 114, 130 (2007) (“While groundwater was indeed ruled an article of commerce by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska, that designation came with a condition of its own-namely 
the right of Congress to so regulate groundwater in the future as an article of commerce.”). 
56. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973; see also Christine A. Klein, The Environmental 
Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
57. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 175–76; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973. 
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it was an entirely voluntary agreement, it was non-binding.58  Congress was not 
asked to ratify that Charter as an interstate compact, thus affording it great 
weight, because of the inclusion of the two Canadian provinces.59  Additionally, 
“the voluntary Charter’s lack of meaningful standards by which diversions were 
to be regulated has proven impossible to enforce, leaving the Basin states and 
provinces with a toothless management tool.”60  Thus, contrary to the intent of 
the Commission, the non-binding nature left the Charter as more of a “gentle-
men’s agreement” than a comprehensive management plan.61
Also devastating to the Charter’s effectiveness, a year after the Charter went 
into effect Congress enacted the 1986 Water Resources Development Act 
(WRDA).62  While the WRDA similarly provided that diversions of Great 
Lakes water without the approval of all eight Great Lakes governors and the 
two Canadian premiers were impermissible, it also allowed a state to “unilater-
ally veto any diversions occurring within an entirely separate state, creating the 
serious potential for abuse of power and conflicts among the Great Lakes gov-
ernors.”63  This unilateral veto power made it impossible for states to act with 
any confidence when it came to diversion issues and altogether discouraged 
investment and ultimate action.64
The WRDA also contained serious foundational problems.  Although its 
enactment by Congress meant it was legally binding and actionable, it did not 
“set any standards or processes for challenging diversions out of the Great 
Lakes.”65  Furthermore, “the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause 
likely rendered the WRDA unconstitutional.”66  Thus, the Charter ultimately 
carried the day for water resources management.  However, the Charter’s weak-
nesses rendered its legacy as merely a “Paper Tiger Regarding Water With-
drawals.”67
58. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 972. 
59. See Beggs, supra note 48, at 367; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 972. 
60. Gabe Johnson-Karp, Comment, That the Waters Shall Be Forever Free: Navigating Wiscon-
sin’s Obligations Under the Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Compact, 94 MARQ. L. REV.
415, 428 (2011). 
61. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 972.
62. Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d–20; see also
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973 n.85.
63. Beggs, supra note 48, at 368. See WRDA, supra note 62, at § 1962d–20(d). See also
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973 (The WRDA “in effect took the dormant commerce clause 
and Sporhase . . . out of play in the basin.”). 
64. Beggs, supra note 48, at 368.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jodi Habush Sinykin & Donna L. McGee, Opportunities and Challenges for State Implemen-
tation of Water Conservation Under the Great Lakes Compact: Report and Toolkit, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1193, 1200 (2006); see also WIS. STAT. §§ 281.35(4)(1)–(2) (2013–2014). 
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In response to the continuing lag in freshwater resource management, the 
Great Lakes governors and premiers appointed representatives to the Water 
Management Working Group to develop what would become the Charter An-
nex.68  Over a period of almost six years, the Working Group consulted with 
the public, water resources experts, and representatives of key stakeholder 
groups to develop a new agreement that would bind the region to a consolidated 
management system while also providing a common standard through which 
diversions and other projects may be reviewed.69  The Annex ultimately led to 
the enactment of the Great Lakes Compact.70
The Great Lakes Compact was thus in a sense a reactionary response to the 
failure of both the Charter and the WRDA.71  Reactionary because the failures 
of the latter two along with the ever-pressing need for the economic and envi-
ronmental preservation of the precious resource all called for a more immediate, 
valid, and lasting means of regional Great Lakes Water management.72  And 
indeed the Compact has been lauded as accomplishing these things because of 
its procedural transparency and the commitment of the governors and premiers 
to holding themselves accountable for its success.73  Additionally, by electing 
the form of an interstate compact, the drafters of the Compact assured a more 
secure means of diversion management, as compacts are unrivalled in potency 
by any existing or proposed institutional arrangement.74  Sanctioned by the 
Constitution,75 interstate compacts “have provided a means by which states 
68. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 177–80; see generally Council of Great Lakes Governors, 
The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter, June 18, 
2001, http://www.cglslgp.org/media/1369/greatlakescharterannex.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XMK-
ESVC] [hereinafter Charter Annex]. 
69. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 175–84; Charter Annex, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
70. Beggs, supra note 48, at 369.
71. See Habush Sinykin & McGee, supra note 67, at 1200.  “For decades Canadians and Amer-
icans in the Great Lakes Basin have feared that the thirsty will come calling.”  ANNIN, supra note 11 
at, 11.  However, some organizations have declared that such large-scale diversions are unlikely, like 
the International Joint Commission instituted by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.  Id. at 11.  Never-
theless, scholars like Professor Noah D. Hall and Dr. Peter H. Gleick validate the fears of Canada and 
the United States in citing the incredible upswing in recent water conflicts as evidence that diversion 
requests will only increase.  Id. at 12–13.  The “somber lesson” of the Aral Sea in the former Soviet 
Union provides credence to the opposition’s view to bar diversions out of the Lakes.  ROBERT
GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2009).  The 
Aral Sea was once the fourth-largest inland body of fresh water. Id.  The Soviets allowed so many 
diversions out of the lake that it lost 90% of its volume and 75% of surface area in a matter of mere 
decades. Id. While the immediate call for Great Lakes water may seem small, many such diversions 
could decimate the region’s water resources, as experienced in the Soviet Union. Id. at 97–98. 
72. See GLENNON, supra note 71, at 96; NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 178–84. 
73. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 182–84. 
74. SHERK, supra note 41, at 29–30.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No state shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State.”).  However, not all compacts must be ratified by 
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could enter into agreements for various purposes, including the delineation of 
shared boundaries, involvement in common-interest projects such as the build-
ing of dams and bridges, and the creation of regional or sub-regional adminis-
trative endeavors such as resource management.”76
Apart from its more significant legal potency, the Compact is “distinguish-
able from its predecessor, the [WRDA], by its establishment of the Regional 
Council to oversee exemption applications and specific standards by which ex-
emption applications are . . . evaluated.”77  The addition of a specific and ac-
countable decision-making body makes the process for diversion more difficult 
and the potential for granting many applications may thus be more limited.78
All this benefits the credibility of the Compact.79
However, although the Great Lakes Compact is a much greater protective 
measure against diversion than ever before, the historical weaknesses of the 
past measures to protect the waters of the Great Lakes bode ill for the reliability 
of this most current effort.80  These persistent weaknesses were recognized by 
New York Congressman Brian Higgins, a member of the Congressional Great 
Lakes Task Force, after the approval of Waukesha’s diversion.81  He instated 
House Bill 5538, which was passed on July 14, 2016, about a month after the 
diversion plan was approved, and grants $300 million to the Great Lakes Res-
toration Initiative Fund.82  Poignantly and seemingly in recognition of the 
Congress.  Only those interstate agreements “tending to the increase of political power in the States, 
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States” are subject to 
Congressional approval.  Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).  The mere fact that the 
Great Lakes Compact required approval by Congress points to the political capital held by those states 
controlling an enormous natural resource. 
76. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 429–30; see also, e.g., Virginia, 148 U.S. at 504; Pennsyl-
vania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 557 (1851); Boulder Canyon Project 
Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 617, 617(c), (g), (l) (2006)).
77. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 431.
78. See id. at 432. 
79. See id.
80. See Habush Sinykin & McGee, supra note 67, at 1199. 
81. Press Release from Rep. Brian Higgins (N.Y.), Higgins Wins Approval for Amendment Pro-
tecting Great Lakes from Future Attempts to Divert Water, (July 14, 2016), https://hig-
gins.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/higgins-wins-approval-for-amendment-protecting-great-
lakes-from-future [https://perma.cc/2WGG-SPQX].  Higgins urged that “[g]oing forward, it will be 
important to ensure that the approval of this request does not set a precedent that will threaten to deplete 
this resource by encouraging further diversion requests that do not uphold the strict water management 
standards outlined in the compact.” Id. Implicit in his remarks were displeasure with the approval and 
lack of confidence in the Council.
82. H.B. 5538, 14th Cong. 2d Sess. Title 1, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-con-
gress/house-bill/5538/text [https://perma.cc/VE84-JQYH].  The funds could be used by “the head of 
any Federal department or agency, with the concurrence of such head, to carry out activities that would 
support the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement programs, 
projects, or activities; to enter into an interagency agreement with the head of such Federal department 
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Council’s highly contested diversion approval, the bill restricts access to the 
Fund by those states who seek to use it “in contravention of the interstate com-
pact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River Ba-
sin.”83
While the bill in theory “tightens up the policy to help restrict further diver-
sions,”84 merely restricting access to federal funding does not in whole protect 
Great Lakes waters.85  A more comprehensive plan including revisions to state 
and federal policy regarding water diversions must be instituted and programs 
shoring up awareness, respect, and conservation of water resources must be un-
dertaken with more seriousness.  The Lakes are still vulnerable to “death by a 
thousand straws.”86  Although their waters are plentiful, they are largely non-
renewable, as “less than 1% of their waters are replenished by annual precipi-
tation” and the other 99% was deposited by the glaciers thousands of years 
ago.87  This means that if more than one percent of water is withdrawn, only the 
assistance of another ice age could realistically replace that which is not re-
turned.88
Regardless of their precarious hydrological position, the Lakes remain a 
“particularly inviting target for diversion proposals.”89  As the they contain an 
unparalleled amount of freshwater—ninety-five percent of the total freshwater 
in the United States and twenty percent of the world’s freshwater—diversion 
requests likely will continue into the foreseeable future.90  With Waukesha’s 
diversion approved, the inevitability of future diversions loom large based on 
the weaknesses of the Compact and its predecessors.91
or agency to carry out these activities; and to make grants to governmental entities, nonprofit organi-
zations, institutions, and individuals for planning, research, monitoring, outreach, and implementation 
in furtherance of the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.” 
83. Id. § 500. 
84. Higgins, supra note 81. 
85. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 12, 71. 
86. Id. at 71. 
87. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 971 (citing Jerome Hinkle, Troubled Waters: Policy and 
Action in the Great Lakes, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 281, 288 (2003) (“it takes 300 years for water for 
water from Lake Superior to reach the Atlantic”)); see ANNIN, supra note 11, at 13. 
88. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 13. 
89. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 970. 
90. Id.
91. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 12 (“I don’t think the era of water diversions is over by any 
means,’ argues Noah Hall, a professor at Wayne State University Law School in Michigan who spent 
years with the National Wildlife Federation.  ‘To me it’s not even a question, it’s an inevitability.  You 
look at what’s happening to water supplies in almost every other part of the country—it used to be just 
the Southwest and California, but now you are seeing it in the Southeast, and the Northeast—the eco-
nomics are fluid.  It’s a simple supply-and-demand model.”).
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III. THE FEDERAL COMPACT ADOPTED IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin, along with all territories that border the Lakes—the eight states, 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania, 92 and two Canadian provinces, Ontario and Quebec, adopted the 
Compact by 2008.93  Congress ratified and President Bush signed the Compact 
into law shortly thereafter.94  The Compact was then incorporated and codified 
by the Wisconsin Legislature into section 281.343 of the Wisconsin Statutes.95
The incorporation is, for the most part, a faithful adaption of the Compact and 
moreover speaks to the process-driven implementation the Compact drafters 
sought to evoke in water managers at all levels.96
The diversion application process in the Wisconsin adaptation largely rep-
licates that of the Federal Compact.97  Applications regarding proposed excep-
tions to the Compact that must undergo regional review98 are evaluated by the 
Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council (the “Coun-
cil”),99 which is composed of the governors of all parties.100  Generally, the 
Council is charged to “adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for 
water resources conservation and management in the basin.”101  Further, a re-
gional body, which in addition to the governors includes the two premiers for 
Ontario and Quebec, is further “charged with oversight authority in the regional 
92. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (2013–2014); 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 147 (2016); IND. CODE
§ 14-25-15-1 (2016); MINN. STAT. § 103G.801 (2015); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 21-1001 (Lex-
isNexis 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1522.01 (LexisNexis 2013); 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 817.21 
(2016). See also Naftzger, supra note 29, at 185. 
93. After Congress ratified the Compact, there was difficulty adopting it in Wisconsin.  See Dan 
Egan, Great Lakes Compact Hits Rough Waters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 2008, http://ar-
chive.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/29486169.html.  Particularly, challenges developed regarding the 
requirement that diversion approvals necessitated the unanimous consent of all eight governors. Id.
To the estimation of some Wisconsin lawmakers, this unreasonably burdened Wisconsin by giving too 
much weight to the prohibition on diversions. Id.
94. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
95. See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2013–2014); Dan Egan, Great Lakes Deal An-
nounced, MILWAUKEE J SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2008; Susan Saulny, Ban Near on Diverting Great Lakes 
Water, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/us/23lakes.html
[https://perma.cc/97XR-YJEW]. 
96. See Egan, supra note 95.
97. See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343; Federal Compact supra note 7. 
98. Proposed diversions to communities within straddling counties must undergo regional re-
view.  WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(f); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3)(f). 
99. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4L)(a) (“Proposals for exceptions subject to council review shall 
be submitted by the originating party to the council for council review, and where applicable, to the 
regional body for concurrent review.”); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.7(1). 
100. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(2)(b) (“The council shall consist of the governors of the parties, 
ex officio.”); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 2.2. 
101. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(3)(a)(3); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 3.1. 
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review process”102 that “stops short of final decision making.”103
The similarities continue in the exceptions to the stringent prohibition on 
“all new or increased diversions” out of the Great Lakes.104  To temper the pro-
hibition and meet reasonable diversion requests outside the basin, the Compact 
included three exceptions to this otherwise rigid embargo.105
The first exception is for “straddling communities.”106  The straddling com-
munities exception provides that communities outside the basin will be permit-
ted diversions, “regardless of the volume of water transferred,”107 so long as 
“all of the water so transferred shall be used solely for public water supply pur-
poses within the straddling community”108 and “[a]ll water withdrawn from the 
basin shall be returned, either naturally or after use, to the source watershed less 
an allowance for consumptive use.”109  A straddling community is defined as 
“any incorporated city, town, or the equivalent thereof, wholly within any 
county that lies partly or completely within the basin, whose corporate bound-
ary existing as of the effective date of this compact is partly within the basin or 
partly within 2 Great Lakes watersheds.”110
The second exception is for “intrabasin transfers.”111  An intrabasin transfer 
is “the transfer of water from the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into the 
watershed of another Great Lake.”112  A proposal for such a transfer will only 
be considered if “the proposal results from a new or increased withdrawal of 
less than 100,000 gallons per day average over any 90-day period, [wherein] 
the proposal shall be subject to management and regulation at the discretion of 
the originating party.”113  Under such management, the exception also requires 
that (1) “[t]he proposal shall meet the exception standard and be subject to man-
agement and regulation by the originating party, except that the water may be 
returned to another Great Lake watershed rather than the source watershed;”114
102. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 431–32; see also WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4h)(e)(9); Federal 
Compact, supra note 7, §§ 1.2, 4.5(5)(i). 
103. Hall, supra note 31, at 1444. 
104. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (2013–2014); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, at art. 47, § 
4.8.
105. See generally WIS. STAT § 281.343(4n) (the diversion exceptions as adopted in Wisconsin); 
see also Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9. 
106. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1). 
107. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1). 
108. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1). 
109. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(1); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1)(a).
110. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(t); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
111. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2).
112. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(jm); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
113. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(1); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, 4.9(2)(a).
114. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(2)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2)(b)(i).
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(2) “[t]he applicant shall demonstrate that there is no feasible, cost-effective, 
and environmentally sound water supply alternative within the Great Lake wa-
tershed to which the water will be transferred, including conservation of exist-
ing water supplies;”115 and (3) “[t]he originating party shall provide notice to 
the other parties prior to making any decision with respect to the proposal.”116
The third exception is for “communit[ies] within straddling counties.”117  A 
community within a straddling county is “any incorporated city, town, or the 
equivalent thereof, that is located outside the basin but wholly within a county 
that lies partly within the basin and that is not a straddling community.”118  Di-
version requests to communities within straddling counties “shall be excepted 
from the prohibition against diversions, provided that it satisfies all of the fol-
lowing conditions:”119
a. The water shall be used solely for the public water supply 
purposes of the community within a straddling county that is 
with- out adequate supplies of potable water; 
b. The proposal meets the exception standard, maximizing the 
portion of water returned to the source watershed as basin wa-
ter and minimizing the surface water or groundwater from out-
side the basin; 
c. The proposal shall be subject to management and regulation 
by the originating party, regardless of its size; 
d. There is no reasonable water supply alternative within the 
basin in which the community is located, including conserva-
tion of existing water supplies; 
e. Caution shall be used in determining whether or not the pro-
posal meets the conditions for this exception. This exception 
should not be authorized unless it can be shown that it will not 
endanger the integrity of the basin ecosystem; 
f. The proposal undergoes regional review; and 
g. The proposal is approved by the council. Council approval 
shall be given unless one or more council members vote to dis-
approve.120
As mentioned previously, Waukesha meets the community within a strad-
dling county exception, and is the first community completely outside of the 
basin to apply for a diversion.121
115. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(2)(b); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2)(b)(ii). 
116. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(2)(c); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2)(b)(iii). 
117. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3). 
118. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(d) (emphasis added); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2. 
119. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3). 
120. WIS. STAT.§ 281.343(4n)(c)(a)–(g); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3)(a)–(g). 
121. David Strifling, Waukesha Diversion Approved; Focus Shifts to Potential Legal Challenges,
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Figure 1: Location and Hydrology of the Basin Divide in Waukesha122
Before any such diversion application can be approved, the Council would 
need to consider whether the community requesting the diversion met the ex-
ception standard.123  The exception standard requires a community requesting 
the diversion to fulfill stringent technical requirements.124  For example, a com-
munity would need to prove, among a few other standards, that no reasonable 
water supply alternative exists; promise that quantities withdrawn would be 
used only for the purposes proposed; and return all water withdrawn from the 
Great Lakes back to the Great Lakes, less an allowance for consumptive use.125  
In turn, the Council would also have to seriously consider whether the diversion 
exception would  
 
MARQ. U. L. BLOG, June 23, 2016, http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2016/06/23/waukesha-diver-
sion-approved-focus-shifts-to-potential-legal-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/X93E-6XAF]; see also su-
pra Figure 1 (showing the location of the City of Waukesha and the basin divide). 
122. CH2M HILL, INC., REPORT WATER SUPPLY SERVICE AREA PLAN FOR THE CITY OF 
WAUKESHA, (Submitted to City of Waukesha, Wis., Apr. 2010) http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/WaterUse/doc-
uments/Waukesha/Appendix_D.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7LF-P2PJ].   
123. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(d). 
124. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n). 
125. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(d)(1)–(3) (where waters returned are not from the Great Lakes, 
they must (a) “[be] part of a water supply or wastewater treatment system that combines water from 
inside and outside of the basin;” and (b) “[be] treated to meet applicable water quality discharge stand-
ards and to prevent the introduction of invasive species into the basin”).  Waukesha laid out its com-
pliance with these standards in its application in five volumes (Application Summary, City of 
Waukesha Water Supply Service Area Plan, City of Waukesha Water Conservation Plan, City of 
Waukesha Return Flow Plan, City of Waukesha Environmental Report for Water Supply Alternatives).  
DIVERSION EIS, supra note 12, at i.   
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be implemented so as to ensure that it will result in no signifi-
cant individual or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity 
or quality of the waters and water dependent natural resources 
of the basin with consideration given to the potential cumula-
tive impacts of any precedent-setting consequences associated 
with the proposal. 126
The precedential impacts of the Waukesha diversion have yet to be felt in 
their entirety; however, the recent request by the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative (the “GLSL Cities Initiative”) for a hearing before the Council 
will likely provide greater insight onto the exception standard’s requirement for 
consideration of precedent-setting consequences.127
Hidden among these procedural and definitional similarities is an impactful 
inconsistency with the Federal Compact, which will remain a thorn in the side 
of regional water conservation management for years to come unless 
amended.128  The Wisconsin adaptation of the Compact includes in its definition 
of community within a straddling county the notion that any diversion to the 
community will extend to its entire service area.129  Section 281.346, entitled 
“after the compact takes effect,” requires that communities within straddling 
counties submit a diversion proposal that “is consistent with an approved water 
supply service area plan under s. 281.348 that covers the public water supply 
system.”130
Herein lies the crux of issue with Waukesha.  Waukesha’s diversion appli-
cation is inflated to reflect of not just the City of Waukesha’s needs, but also 
the needs of other communities outside the municipal boundaries to which the 
Waukesha Water Utility extends water service.131  Under section 4(e), such a 
request is required and a subsequent diversion is valid.132  However, applying 
the language of the Federal Compact, a diversion would only extend to the 
boundaries of the City of Waukesha and no further.133  This glaring incon-
sistency was one hurdle Waukesha faced before the Council and the Council’s 
final decision approved Waukesha’s service area to the municipality itself and 
126. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(d)(4).
127. Request for Hearing Letter from Jill M. Hutchinson, J.D., Jenner & Block, LLP, on behalf 
of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, to Executive Director of the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council (Aug. 19, 2016) (on file with author). 
128. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e); see generally Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2. 
129. WIS. STAT. § 281.346 (2013–2014). 
130. WIS. STAT. § 281.346, 281.346(4)(e)(1)(em). 
131. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5)(b); infra Figure 2. 
132. WIS. STAT. § 281.346(4)(e) (2013–2014). 
133. See Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2. 
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town islands, thus extending water service beyond the City’s boundaries.134  
However, as Section V will illustrate, communities like Waukesha—land-
locked, thirsty, and determined to divert—may do so regardless of a diversion 
application denial at either the state or federal level.135 
 
Figure 2: Approved Diversion Area136 
 
134. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5). 
135. Infra Part V. 
136. Approval Decision, supra note 15, Attachment 1. 
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While the Compact’s adoption in Wisconsin presents significant issues for 
the future, the Compact’s progressive nature deserves praise.  Although hydro-
logical principles showed, and the legislatures of various states had recognized 
to some degree, that groundwater and surface water are hydrologically con-
nected in many, if not most instances, the law itself was slow to adjust.137  In 
fact, the law in many regions beyond just the Great Lakes continues to treat 
them as separate legal entities.138  However, the Compact took a progressive 
measure by defining water as “groundwater or surface water contained within 
the basin.”139  The Compact as so adopted by the Wisconsin Legislature went 
on to recognize that waters of the basin, or basin water, refers to “the Great 
Lakes and all streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels, and other bodies of 
water, including tributary groundwater, within the basin.”140  This progressive 
declaration was one of many that hopefully will herald in a new area and ap-
proach to water law and policy.141
IV. WAUKESHA’S DIVERSION APPLICATION
Waukesha’s road to a diversion was neither short, nor easy to travel.  Sec-
tion IV.A will review the history of Waukesha’s water use and the hurdles it 
jumped to ultimately receive a diversion.142  Section IV.B will dissect the Ap-
proval Decision as it concerns the diversion area ultimately adopted by the 
Council and will analyze how the vagueness in the Council’s decision leaves 
the Compact vulnerable.143
A. History Leading Up to the Approval 
The City of Waukesha rests on what once was one of the most sought after 
freshwater resources in the American Midwest.144  So famous was the “Spring 
City” aquifer that during the 1892 World’s Fair a riot almost erupted when a 
137. R. Timothy Weston, Partner, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, Evolving
Issues in Eastern Water Law, Harmonizing Management of Ground and Surface Water Use, A.B.A.
15TH ANN. SEC. ENV’T, ENERGY & RES. FALL MEETING (Pittsburgh, Pa. Sept. 26, 2007). 
138. Id. at I (“In large part, the common law doctrines governing surface and groundwater use 
evolved separately, with little to no recognition of the nexus between surface and groundwater within 
the hydrologic cycle.”). 
139. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(v) (2013–2014).
140. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(x). 
141. Id.
142. See supra section IV.A. 
143. See supra section IV.B. 
144. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 240. 
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Chicago businessman, frustrated by failed negotiations to divert the famous wa-
ters south to the fair, sent a midnight train full of workers to steal Waukesha’s 
water.145  Today, while the aboveground city has retained its historic charac-
ter,146 below ground, its historically pristine drinking water is a thing of the past. 
The City of Waukesha is currently home to more than 71,000 residents,147
as well as large-scale commercial and industrial water consumers.148  These 
numbers are projected to grow149 and as they have grown in the past, the at-
tendant effect has been an overdraft of Spring City’s wells, resulting in plum-
meting water levels and contamination of the underground aquifer.150  While 
the supply of the water has dropped significantly in the past twenty years, 
alarming from both an economic and ecological perspective, of more immedi-
ate concern is the contamination issue.151  Waukesha first informed its citizens 
that their drinking water was contaminated with radionuclides in 1987.152  The 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a notice of violation to the 
City, advising it that the water supply was contaminated with radium at twice 
the federal level that same year.153  Radium, a carcinogen once celebrated for 
its luminosity and cosmetic enhancing effects,154 currently resides on the United 
145. Id. at 241.  The townspeople reacted to the oncoming heist with equal fervor, arming them-
selves and meeting the train as a mob. Id. The thieves never disembarked and returned to Chicago 
that night empty-handed and unwilling to return.  Id.
146. Beyond the infamous water war, the city itself is home to numerous historic sites and has 
even achieved Landmark & Historic District Designation according to section 28.01 of the Waukesha 
Municipal Code, making its wholesome surface appearance markedly different from that which lies 
beneath.  WAUKESHA, WIS., CODE § 28.01 (2013–2014). 
147. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 241; see also United States Census Bureau, State & County Quick 
Facts; Waukesha (city) Wisconsin, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/5584250,00
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
148. Technical Memorandum from Richard Hope, P.E., AECOM, to Waukesha Water Utility 2 
(Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with author) (the industrial consumers use about 13% of the annual water 
supply with projections for growth by 2050, necessitating the larger diversion of 10 million plus gallons 
of water per day); Don Behm, Waukesha defends water use projections in Lake Michigan diversion 
bid, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 20, 2014, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/waukesha-
defends-water-use-projections-in-lake-michigan-diversion-bid-b99210127z1-246428621.html
[https://perma.cc/D8QP-A5HA]. 
149. Id. at 2.
150. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 241. 
151. See id. at 241–42. 
152. Noah Hall, Waukesha Great Lakes water diversion proposal strongly opposed, GREAT
LAKES LAW BLOG (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/great_lakes_compact/ 
[https://perma.cc/3VUS-RFVD]. [hereinafter Hall Blog]; see also John Luczaj & Kevin Masarik, 
Groundwater Quantity and Quality Issues in a Water-Rich Region: Examples from Wisconsin, USA, 4 
MDPI RES. 324, 338 (2015).
153. Hall Blog, supra note 152; see ANNIN, supra note 11, at 241–42; see generally ATSDR 
CDC Radium Notice, supra note 14. 
154. Taylor Orci, How we Realized Putting Radium into Everything Was Not the Answer, THE
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/03/how-we-realized-putting-radium-in-
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States Environmental Protection Agency’s list of three groups of restricted ra-
dionuclides that appear in groundwater.155  The radium contamination issue, 
while for years increasing in seriousness, finally reached levels of such concern 
that in 2003 the State of Wisconsin required Waukesha to sign a consent order 
agreeing to take “certain interim and permanent steps to achieve compliance 
with state radionuclide requirements” by December 8, 2006.156  The EPA placed 
an order on the City to alleviate the problem by 2018.157
The problem of radium contamination is not unique to Waukesha.  As Fig-
ure 3 depicts, eighteen counties in the state of Wisconsin face some level of 
radium contamination.158  Many of these counties straddle the Great Lakes ba-
sin divide.159  The watershed extends furthest inland in the northernmost part of 
everything-was-not-the-answer/273780/ [https://perma.cc/W3N8-A76M] (Mar. 7, 2013); see ATSDR
CDC Radium Notice, supra note 14. 
155. Radionuclides Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/dwre-
ginfo/radionuclides-rule#compliance [https://perma.cc/5CY2-9LSN] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  The 
EPA set the standard for radium in drinking water at 226/228 picoCuries per liter (pCi/L) to ensure 
water customers obtain water that meets the maximum contaminant levels for the toxin.  Id.  As reiter-
ated above, Waukesha currently must treat water containing more than twice the federal levels. ANNIN,
supra note 11, at 241.  Although radionuclides appear “naturally in most rocks and soils,” they can 
easily “dissolve in water, which means they can be drawn into . . . well water.”  RadTown U.S.A., U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/radtown/subpage.html#?
scene=The+Burbs&polaroid=House&sheet=1 [https://perma.cc/72RM-34U5] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017).  The deeper a well is dug, more likely is the chance that “the soil and rocks surrounding a well 
have high enough concentrations . . . contain[ing] levels that exceed EPA’s standards.” Id.
156. Judgment, Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, No. 2009-CX-4 (Cir. Ct. Waukesha Cty. Apr. 
8, 2009); see Annin, supra note 11, at 242; see also Stipulation and Order for Judgment, Wisconsin v. 
City of Waukesha, No. 2009-CX-4 (Cir. Ct. Waukesha Cty. Apr. 8, 2009).  
157. Dan Shaw, Waukesha’s water application sent to Great Lake states, provinces for review, 
THE DAILY REPORTER (Milwaukee, WI), Jan. 7, 2016.
158. See infra Figure 3. 
159. Of the eighteen counties indicated as having radium problems in Figure 3, seven straddle 
the divide.  Of these seven counties, three (Racine, Waukesha, and Dodge Counties) are home to seven 
communities whose groundwater is contaminated with radium above the federal level. Compare infra
Figure 3, with Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Great Lakes Drainage Basins in Wisconsin,  WDNR: GREAT
LAKES, http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/greatlakes/documents/DrainageBasinsMap.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/2PXC-U9T7] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter WDNR Great Lakes Drainage 
Basin Map], and Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Radium in Drinking Water. PUB-DG-008 2014, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/files/pdf/pubs/dg/dg0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5S7-5W6J] (last visited on Feb. 7, 
2017).  While seven is arguably a low number of communities, the amount of legal, technical, and 
industrial infrastructure needed to supply these communities with uncontaminated water would con-
servatively total than $1.449 billion. See Don Behm, Opponents of Waukesha water diversion plan 
focus on service map, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 12, 2015, http://ar-
chive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/opponents-of-waukesha-water-diversion-plan-focus-on-service-
map-b99535418z1-314442901.html [https://perma.cc/N6NH-JEXX] (Waukesha estimated it would 
cost about $207 million to build the means of providing Great Lakes water, and the sum of $207 million 
multiplied by seven is $1.449 billion).
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the State from the shores of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior.160 As the Basin 
extends southward, the divide ebbs and flows out from the shores of Lake Mich-
igan, eventually receding closer and closer to the shoreline.161  In Kenosha 
County, at the boarder of Wisconsin and Illinois, the divide reaches its narrow-
est point in the State.162  There, the divide runs nearly through the direct center 
of the city of Kenosha.163  In Waukesha County, the basin divide extends to the 
rough line of Sunny Slope Road, west of the City of Milwaukee.164 This posi-
tion on the basin divide fortunately provided the City of Waukesha the avenue 
it needed to resolve its radium problem, as it opened the possibility for a Great 
Lakes water diversion.165 
Figure 3: Wisconsin Wells Contaminated with Radium Above EPA 
Maximum Level166
Waukesha recognized that it would not be able to comply with the Order 
and independently alleviate its radium contamination as 2018 approached.167  
 
160. DIVERSION EIS supra note 12, at 1. 
161. Id. at 2, figure 3.3 at 32.
162. WDNR Great Lakes Drainage Basin Map, supra note 159. 
163. Id. 
164. See supra Figure 1.   
165. See infra Section V.  
166. Luczaj & Masarik, supra note 152, at 337 (“Region of the state with the majority of wells 
that exceed the U.S. EPA maximum containment levels (MCL) for combined Radium of 5 pCi/L (0.185 
Bq/L).”). 
167. Don Behm, Waukesha concedes it can’t meet deadline for radium-free water, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL, Nov. 19, 2014, http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/waukesha-concedes-it-can-
meet-deadline-for-radium-free-water-b99393845z1-283255831.html [https://perma.cc/6DYU-
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However, the Order by the state and the EPA, coupled with the adoption of the 
Great Lakes Compact at a federal and state level, opened the way for Waukesha 
to request the help it desperately needed.168  Before it could apply for a diver-
sion, Waukesha first was required to exhaust alternative source options before 
looking eastward toward the Lakes.169  This was not an impossible feat.  For 
example, New Berlin, a community that borders the Basin and thus fitting the 
straddling community exception, was “the first practical application” of the 
Compact to be granted diversion and drew praise from numerous environmental 
advocates for its creative attempts to source water from elsewhere outside the 
basin.170  It was also required to return all water withdrawn back to Lake Mich-
igan.171
Before conceding to these processes, Waukesha creatively argued that it 
was hydrologically unique and deserving of special consideration.172  In ad-
dressing the issue of return flow173 Waukesha argued that it was already ex-
tracting water that came directly from Lake Michigan as underground re-
charge.174  This argument was essentially purporting that Waukesha did not 
need a return flow plan as it in fact did not need to apply for a diversion.175  In 
ways, the argument was sensible.  It took up the yoke of a long running dispute 
centering on the interconnected nature of ground and surface waters—a dispute 
that scientists, hydrologists, and the Compact drafters themselves had champi-
oned for years in the face of unchanging legislation and legal agency red tape.176
And in the face of the Compact, which specifically granted Great Lakes “trib-
utary groundwater” classification and protection, the argument was all the more 
supported.177  Nevertheless, these arguments failed to take flight and directed 
GXMP]. 
168. See Stipulation and Order for Judgment, Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, No. 2009-CX-4 ¶ 
13 (Cir. Ct. Waukesha Cty. Apr. 8, 2009); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9.
169. See WIS. STAT. 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(d) (2013–2014) (providing that diversions are only pos-
sible where “[t]here is no reasonable water supply alternative within the basin in which the community 
is located, including conservation of existing water supplies”). 
170. Darryl Enriquez, New Berlin’s request for lake water approved, a first under Great Lakes 
Compact, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 21, 2009, 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/45700837.html [https://perma.cc/T63W-8HF5]. 
171. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(1) (2013–2014).
172. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 247. 
173. Not to be discussed in detail this Comment are the issues of return flow and the conservation 
plan required by the compact.  Waukesha has considered these requirements and provided detailed 
plans for both in its application and environmental impact statement.
174. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 247–49. 
175. Id.
176. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1m)(2) (“The waters of the basin are interconnected and part of a 
single hydrologic system.”); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.3; Weston, supra note 137, at I.
177. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(x). 
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Waukesha further down its path to submitting to a diversion proposal.178
As it looked more and more certain that a diversion proposal was the only 
means by which Waukesha could supply uncontaminated water, Waukesha was 
forced to consider the headache the Compact’s conservation requirements 
would impose upon them.179  This headache would be considerable, especially 
given Waukesha’s long history of neglecting conservation practices.180  In 
2005, the city took a new approach to soften its image as a water waster.181  It 
instituted a sprinkler limitation on individual property owners, only permitting 
sprinkler use two days week from May through October between the hours of 
5 p.m. and 9 a.m.182  It also provided rebates for buyers of certain water-efficient 
toilets, created a rate structure that promoted water conservation, and engaged 
in community and educational outreach.183  All of these efforts were cited to on 
the eventual application as evidence of Waukesha’s commitment to solving its 
water crisis.184
Ultimately, the immediately pressing need for uncontaminated water forced 
Waukesha to comply with the Compact’s diversion request processes.185  The 
first application was submitted in May 2010 to the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources (“WDNR”), and a revised version was resubmitted in 
2013.186  In its Conservation Plan, Waukesha designated itself as a “water con-
servation leader” based on the significant steps it had recently taken to protect 
its limited water supply.187  It also at last conceded to a return flow plan through 
178. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 245. 
179. Id. at 245–46.
180. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 246.  The City of Waukesha’s “underwhelming water conservation 
record” was a subject of critical debate in the years and months leading up to submitting its diversion 
application. Id.  For example, the city “prided itself on never having a sprinkling ban,” offering “cus-
tomers a sewer credit for water applied to their grass.”  Id.
181. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 246.
182. WAUKESHA, WIS., CODE § 13.11(3) (2006). 
183. Application Summary, City of Waukesha Application for a Lake Michigan Diversion with 
Return Flow, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., ftp://dnrftp01.wi.gov/geodata/water_division/waukesha_diver-
sion/application/1_City_of _Waukesha_Application__Summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2017), § 3.4 
[hereinafter Application Summary].
184. Id.
185. See generally City of Waukesha Diversion Application Timeline, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES.,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/WaterUse/waukesha/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/54KK-R4PF] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2017); Sarah E. Sharp, Interpreting Water Conservation Standards in Waukesha, Wisconsin: A 
Local Internalization of International Norms?, 16 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 113 (2012). 
186. Application Summary, supra note 183, at iii. This diversion request is less than the original 
request for 10.9 million gallons a day.  Id.
187. City of Waukesha Water Conservation Plan, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES.,
ftp://dnrftp01.wi.gov/geodata/water_division/waukesha_diversion/applica-
tion/3_City_of_Waukesha_Conservation_Plan.pdf. (last visited Feb. 7, 2017), § 1. The Conservation 
Plan spanned more than 200 pages, detailing the background of the city’s conservation efforts and its 
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the Root River.188  After exploring the possibility of spending $77 million on 
developing new wells in underground aquifers just to the west of the city, 
Waukesha concluded that the $42 million price tag to build a pipeline from and 
develop a return flow plan to the Lake was more palatable.189  Finally, in ad-
dressing the potential for treatment plans, the City argued that potential treat-
ment plans were too costly and found that all alternative sources lacked longev-
ity for the city’s anticipated growth.190
On December 9, 2015, the diversion application was granted a preliminary 
approval by the WDNR.191  In its Drafted Environmental Impact Statement, the 
WDNR advised that (1) the city does not have a reasonable water supply alter-
native other than Lake Michigan; (2) “the diversion will not alter the flows or 
levels of the Great Lakes” because of the City’s return flow plan; and (3) the 
potential supply alternatives “are likely to have a greater overall adverse envi-
ronmental impacts primarily due to projected impacts on wetlands and 
lakes.”192  All of these issues had been adequately demonstrated by Waukesha 
in its diversion application.193  Shortly after the WDNR approval, on January 7, 
2016, the diversion application was forwarded on to the Council, which re-
viewed the application and gave it final approval on June 21, 2016.194
B. The First Diversion Outside the Basin, Approved 
The June 2016 approval was granted by a unanimous vote of the Council.195
continued commitment to them. Id., § 2. 
188. Many water conservationists disparaged the Root River plan, because the river itself already 
had its own contamination issues.  Returning 8.1 million gallons a day—the amount ultimately ap-
proved in the June 2016 Approval Decision—water conservationists argued would only exacerbate an 
existing problem.  See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § 5, 7a, 8e. Waukesha’s mayor, Shawn Riley, 
alternatively posited that “the wastewater returned to the Lake will be fully treated to levels that satisfy 
all applicable state standards. The increased flow will actually improve water quality in the river.”  
David Strifling, Waukesha and Racine Mayors Stake Out Opposing Positions on Water Diversion Ap-
plication, MARQ. U. L. BLOG., Feb. 4, 2016, http://law.marquette.edu/facul-
tyblog/2016/02/04/waukesha-and-racine-mayors-stake-out-opposing-positions-on-water-diversion-
application/ [https://perma.cc/2WFH-R2KC]. 
189. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 243. 
190. Behm, Waukesha concedes it can’t meet deadline, supra note 167 (“Continued reliance on 
radium-tainted deep wells would require additional costly treatment to remove the contaminant as well 
as increasing levels of salt released from the rock layers.”). 
191. Don Behm, DNR to advance Waukesha water diversion bid to Great Lakes governors,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 8 2015, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/dnr-to-advance-
waukesha-water-diversion-bid-to-great-lakes-governors-b99630401z1-360964451.html.
192. DIVERSION EIS, supra note 12, at 5, 195–96.
193. See generally Application Summary, supra note 183, § 6. 
194. See Approval Decision supra note 15, §§ I (4), III (1); Behm, DNR to advance Waukesha 
water diversion bid, supra note 191.
195. Approval Decision, supra note 15, at 14. 
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While in sum granting the diversion, the approval came with certain amend-
ments and conditions on the initial request.196  The most obvious changes are 
the decrease from Waukesha’s original request for 10.1 million to 8.2 million 
gallons per day, and the reduction of the diversion area.197  Though not clearly 
articulated, these reductions nevertheless have significant precedential value as 
they set the standards for future diversions.198  Particularly relevant to this Com-
ment is the reduction of the service area to only the municipal boundaries and 
the “town islands.”199
Waukesha initially based its application on its water supply service area, 
thus including all areas to which its water utility provided water services.200
These areas included small pockets, known as “town islands,” to be absorbed 
into Waukesha via an intergovernmental agreement, as well as areas in the City 
of Pewaukee, the Town of Delafield, the Town of Genesee, and the Town of 
Waukesha, all to which the city provided water in limited capacities through its 
water utility.201
Provision of water services outside the boundaries to these outside areas 
was contemplated in Wisconsin’s adaptation of the Compact and its incorpora-
tion into the larger statutory scheme.202  While free to adopt the Federal Com-
pact, the states had leave to make their adaptations narrower according to fed-
eral preemption principals.203  Nevertheless, and as discussed above in Section 
IV, Wisconsin’s adaptation of the Federal Compact differs significantly in its 
definition of “community.”204  Where the Federal Compact defines it narrowly 
as a “city, town, or equivalent thereof,” 205 Wisconsin defines it much more 
broadly.206  Its statutes implementing the Compact procedures at section 
281.346 and section 281.348 include provisions that require the diversion area 
to encompass the “water supply service area plan.”207  This broader definition 
196. Id. § III(2). 
197. Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ I(1), II(5). See supra Figure 2. 
198. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(10).
199. Id. § II(5)(5b)(i–ii). 
200. Id. §§ I(1), II(5); see also City of Waukesha Water Supply Service Area Plan § 3, CH2M
HILL, INC., Oct. 2013, prepared for the City of Waukesha and Submitted to the Wis. Dep’t Nat. Res.  
http://www.waukeshadiversion.org/media/1646/2_city_of_waukesha_water_supply_ser-
vice_area_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HSA-G3GT]. 
201. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ I(1), II(5); see also Application Summary, supra 
note 183, § 3.3. 
202. See Wis. Stat. § 281.343(4n) (2013–2014). 
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2. 
204. See discussion supra Section III. 
205. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
206. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(d)(2013–2014). 
207. See WIS. STAT. § § 281.346(4)(e)(1)(em) (2013–2014) (“The proposal is consistent with an 
approved water supply service area plan under s. 281.348 that covers the public water supply system.”). 
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allowed for most of Waukesha’s service area, even that outside of its municipal 
boundaries, to be granted access to Lake Michigan water to be approved for a 
diversion by the WDNR.208  These inconsistencies seem to run afoul of the uni-
versal stated purpose of the Compact: to “facilitate consistent approaches to 
water management across the basin.”209
In sum, the Council based its Approval Decision on Wisconsin’s definition 
of community,210 and in so doing either pointedly ignored or essentially ratified 
Wisconsin’s violation of federal preemption principals.211  The Council man-
dated that “ [n]o part of the Diversion of water from the Basin authorized as the 
Approved Diversion Amount may be used by the Originating Party or the Ap-
plicant for any territory outside of the Approved Diversion Area.”212  The Ap-
proved Diversion Area was greatly reduced from that originally requested as it 
extended only to “[i]ncorporated land within the boundaries of the City of 
Waukesha and land outside the City of Waukesha’s jurisdictional boundaries 
that is served with municipal water by the Applicant through the Waukesha 
Water Utility as of May 18, 2016.”213  Nevertheless, this area allowed Great 
Lakes waters to be diverted outside of those areas the Federal Compact con-
templated.214
In approving the diversion to extend outside of the City of Waukesha’s mu-
nicipal boundaries, the Council refuted the precedent of  “[t]he highest courts 
of at least two states, . . . [which] have said that a water compact is federal law 
for purposes of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, and thus, it 
supersedes inconsistent state laws.”215 Essentially, where differences emerge 
between a federal compact and a state’s adaptation of the same, the federal 
compact should prevail, even where “a compact is silent on how its terms effect 
208. Id.
209. WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (1m)(b)(4). 
210. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ II(5), II(5)(b)(i).
211. See infra Part IV. 
212. Approval Decision, supra note 15, § III(2)(b). 
213. Id. § II(5)(5b)(b)(i). 
214. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5)(5b)(b)(ii). 
215. SHERK, supra note 41, at 47 (citing Grant, ‘Water Apportionment Compacts Between 
States,’ 4 Waters and Water Rights ch. 46-14, at 46-14 to -15 (R. Beck ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 
2004) (1991)); Frontier Ditch Co. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 761 P.2d 1117, 1123 (Colo. 
1988); State ex rel. Intake Water Co. v. Bd. of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 645 P.2d 383, 387 (Mont. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982). 
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state law.”216  In its Approval Decision, the Council did not follow this estab-
lished precedent.217
Additionally, the decision did not substantially articulate any clear stand-
ards regarding the definition of “community.”218  Rather, an amorphous stand-
ard emerged regarding service areas, whereby the limits of the diversion are 
established at the discretion of the Council.219  As a result, ambiguities and 
questions remain regarding the distance to which the Council would permit a 
diversion outside a requesting party’s boundaries and what standards those out-
side areas must meet in order to attain diverted waters.220
These ambiguities and questions tee up the Compact for significant legal 
challenges.221  Already the Council’s decision has been challenged by the Great 
Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, which on August 19, 2016, requested a 
hearing to, among other things, oppose “the service area that includes commu-
nities that are not part of the City of Waukesha.”222  These challenges may bring 
a more articulated standard to light, but until then, the Approval Decision has 
wracked the Compact with even more vulnerabilities.223  As discussed below in 
Section V, these vulnerabilities will reach beyond Waukesha to Kenosha’s wa-
ter woes, which likely be exacerbated by the decision.224
V. KENOSHA: A LEGISLATIVE CHECK ON MUNICIPAL DIVERSIONS AND A 
DIRECT HIT ON THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT
The Compact’s potency is currently being tested, unacknowledged by the 
Compact Council.225  Very recently, the City of Kenosha attempted to limit its 
provision of water supply services to the newly incorporated Town of Som-
ers.226  In response, during the summer of 2015, the Wisconsin State Legislature 
216. SHERK, supra note 41 (stating that when the terms conflict or differ in a state’s adaptation 
of a compact, “the results [in applying the compact] are likely to be the same”); see Hall Blog, supra
note 152.
217. See SHERK, supra note 41; Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5). 
218. Compare Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ II(1) with II(5)(5b)(i). 
219. See id. § II(5); see generally Hall Blog, supra note 152. 
220. See generally Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5); Hall Blog, supra note 152. 
221. Press Release, Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, Cities Challenge Decision to Al-
low Waukesha Water Diversion—Aim to Preserve Great Lakes Regional Compact (Aug. 22, 2016) 
(on file with author); see also Infra Section V.
222. Press Release, Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, supra note 221. 
223. See generally Federal Compact, supra note 7; Approval Decision, supra note 15, § III. 
224. See supra Section V.  
225. See Press Release, Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, supra note 221. 
226. Meeting Minutes from Board of Water Commissioners Meeting, Charter Ordinance No. 37 
by the Mayor—Electing Not To Be Governed by the Provisions of Wis. Stat. § 66.0813(5m), and Es-
tablishing Limits on the City’s Provision of Water and Sewer Service Outside of Its Municipal Bound-
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buried in the state budget bill Item 66,227 which limited Kenosha’s denial of 
said services to neighboring municipalities,228 and thus the newly minted Town 
of Somers secured a diversion of Great Lakes water to the site of a large-scale 
industrial development.229  The incorporation of the Town of Somers combined 
with the legal implications of Item 66 circumnavigated the procedures enacted 
by the Great Lakes Compact to restrict such diversions.230  This circumnaviga-
tion has not been widely discussed and seems an underappreciated piece of leg-
islative fiat and municipal deception.231
Section V.A will briefly explore the history of Kenosha’s water supply and 
the Town of Somers’ position on the basin divide.232  Section V.B will discuss 
the implications of the incorporation.233  Section V.C will analyze Item 66, the 
recent legislation strong-arming Kenosha’s water supply to Somers.234  Section 
V.D will discuss the serious, though covert, implications that Item 66 has for 
vitality of the Great Lakes Compact.235  Last, Section V.E will weigh the coun-
terarguments and limitations to these implications.236  In conclusion, this Sec-
tion will demonstrate the lack of administrative oversight that should regulate 
aries, http://kenosha.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file=ke-
nosha_6ea35b4510be567352d4a5441ca2f07a.pdf&view=1 [https://perma.cc/X3KL-G5R9] (Nov. 2, 
2015).
227. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015). See Jon Brines, Kreuser defends de-
velopment deal involving chief of staff, KENOSHA NEWS, July 15, 2015, http://www.ke-
noshanews.com/news/kreuser_defends_development_deal_involving_chief_of_staff_483541504.php
[https://perma.cc/H4LT-PQ77] [hereinafter Brines Kreuser] (“Rep. Samantha Kerkman, R-Salem, said 
she drafted the legislation with Kreuser, with Somers in mind.”). 
228. WIS STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m)(b). 
229. Lawrie Kobza, Legislature Limits Kenosha’s Ability to Deny Extension of Municipal Water 
or Sewer Service, MUN. L. NEWSL. (Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison, Wis.), July/August 2015 § 3.   
230. Communities within straddling counties are required by the Compact, whether as adopted 
by Wisconsin or by the Federal Compact, to submit an application for any new diversion.  See Federal 
Compact, supra note 7, § 4.3; see WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e).  The incorporation of the Village of 
Somers and the continued annexation of the Town of Somers, though nominal in nature, nevertheless 
seems to indicate that there are at the very least nominally new diversions occurring to Town of Som-
ers. The Compact’s lack of language excluding such new diversions and its otherwise strict require-
ments for any diversion outside the basin seem to require an application.  
231. Lawrie Kobza, a lawyer for the city of Kenosha, issued a client alert through her firm, 
Boardman & Clark LLP, Municipal Law Newsletter, shortly after Item 66 was passed. Kobza, supra
note 229.  Therein she warned her clients that “[i]f the terms of a negotiated agreement can be overrid-
den so easily, it calls into question the binding nature of all intergovernmental agreements.” Id.  Ms. 
Kobza’s keen observation drew this author’s attention to the weakness the Compact faces in light of 
the Wisconsin State Legislature’s blatant rejection of an important, national intergovernmental agree-
ment.  
232. Infra Section V.A. 
233. Infra Section V.B. 
234. Infra Section V.C. 
235. Infra Section V.D. 
236. Infra Section V.E. 
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diversions of any scale both within and without of the basin.237
A. The Recent Incorporation of the Town and Village of Somers 
Kenosha County is wedged snugly between the Wisconsin–Illinois border 
to the south, and Lake Michigan to the east.238  In the northern part of the 
county, extending at its farthest point at a little less than five miles out from the 
shores of Lake Michigan, lies the recently incorporated Town (to the west) and 
Village of Somers (to the east along Lake Michigan).239
237. See infra Conclusion.
238. See infra Figure 4; see generally Incorporation Process, Proposed New Somers Boundary 
Map dated Feb. 23, 2015, THE TOWN AND VILLAGE OF SOMERS, http://somers.org/sites/de-
fault/files/2015%20Uploads/PROPOSED%20VILLAGE%20MAP%202-23-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D29W-8TE4] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
239. See infra Figure 5.  Figure 5 shows the proposed, and subsequently adopted, boundary-lines 
for the Town and Village of Somers.  Id.  The map also shows the areas left to be absorbed by Kenosha 
per the original 2005 intergovernmental agreement. Id.
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240. KENOSHA, WIS., ORDINANCE NO. 28-10, Comprehensive Plan for the City of Kenosha: 
2035, Map 3-12, (Adopted Apr. 19, 2010) https://www.kenosha.org/im-
ages/dev_insp/COMP_plan/COMP-PLAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM5R-PJRJ].  
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Figure 5: Town and Village of Somers Proposed and Subsequently Adopted 
Boundaries241 
 
Until April of 2015, the Town and Village were a conjoined and unified 
municipality known as the Town of Somers.242  In place between the former 
whole Town of Somers and the City of Kenosha was the “City of Kenosha and 
Town of Somers Cooperative Plan Under Section 66.0307 Wisconsin Statutes” 
(Cooperative Plan), an intergovernmental agreement that required certain areas 
of Somers (“Growth Areas”) to be annexed and thus absorbed into the City of 
 
241. Incorporation Process, Proposed New Somers Boundary Map dated Feb. 23, 2015, supra 
note 238. 
242. Terry Flores, Somers Town, Village to Become One, Boards Approve Intergovernmental 
Agreement, Annexation, KENOSHA NOW, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/som-
ers_town_village_to_become_one _484913884.php. 
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Kenosha by 2035.243  The agreement contemplated the Town incorporating as 
a Town or Village and provided that in the event this should occur, the new 
municipal entities would be bound by the terms of the Cooperative Plan.244  Ad-
ditionally, the Cooperative Plan incorporated by reference past agreements be-
tween the whole Town and the City in which the two entities agreed that the 
City would extend services to Town Growth Areas.245
Before the contemplated annexation could occur, wealthy developers set 
their sights to build an industrial complex on a family farm, becoming one of 
the few large-scale industrial developments in the Town.246  The site, at the 
intersection of Highways H and S, was a little less than a mile from the basin 
divide and wholly within the watershed.247  Suddenly, events were put into mo-
tion that would chip away at the integrity of the agreement.248  Shortly after the 
proposal occurred, Somers applied for an incorporation application to cut the 
town in two and in effect force the City of Kenosha to serve water to the new 
Town and Village of Somers at low costs for the municipalities.249
Today, the remnant Town is split by the basin divide, as the “[f]ar western 
portions of Somers, lie[s] west of the sub-continental divide . . . and 
drain[s] . . . ultimately to the Mississippi River.”250  In contrast, the Village is 
243. See City of Kenosha and Town of Somers Cooperative Plan Under Section 66.0307 Wis-
consin Statutes, § 18 & Annex C, http://somers.org/sites/default/files/CITY%20OF%20KENOSH-
TOWN%20OF%20SOMERS%20COOPERATIVE%20PLAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/T57X-XPB8] 
[hereinafter Cooperative Plan]; see also Jon Brines, DOT request complicates Somers-Kenosha bor-
ders, State Wants Properties Adjacent to Certain Highway Annexed into City, KENOSHA NOW, May 3, 
2015, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/dot_request_. complicates_somerskenosha_bor-
ders_482502068.php; supra Figure 5 (yellow areas represent Town of Somers and blue areas represent 
former Town of Somers areas that will be annexed by the City of Kenosha). 
244. Cooperative Plan, supra note 243.
245. Id. § 18. 
246. See Kobza, supra note 229; see also Brines Kreuser supra note 227.
247. See supra Figure 5 (the basin divide is at 100th Avenue, and the site is just east of this at 
the intersection of 88th and 38th Streets). 
248. These events were precipitated by the pressing urges of the wealthy developers who sought 
water services to a new industrial development proposed in the middle part of the town. See Kobza, 
supra note 229, § 3; Terry Flores, Council OKs 38th Street rezoning, Residents object, say they’re 
being shut out by developer, KENOSHA NOW, Jan. 20, 2016, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/coun-
cil _oks_38th_street_rezoning_486234077.php.  It seems that Kenosha saw this development as a 
threat to the intergovernmental agreement in place between itself and the Town and denied the exten-
sion to the development.  In an effort to avoid Kenosha’s limitation, the Town incorporated the new 
Village and succeeding in seeking legislation via Item 66 to allow the development to continue.  
249. VILLAGE OF SOMERS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, Apr. 24, 2015, http://www.som-
ers.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Uploads/VillageCertofIncorp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS34-AKUP] 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
250. Profile of Village and Town: Surface Waters and Drainage Basins, THE VILLAGE AND 
TOWN OF SOMERS, http://www.somers.org/?q=print/118 [https://perma.cc/SF4W-5K2Q] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2017). The new Village of Somers acts under a “a dual governance with the remnant town of 
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directly adjacent to Lake Michigan and as it “lies entirely east of the sub-conti-
nental divide that separates the Great Lakes basin from the Mississippi River 
basin . . . [all of its important waterways] drain . . . ultimately into Lake Mich-
igan.”251  The geological positions of the Town and Village are unique in that 
they each could individually be afforded diversions: the Town is within a 
“straddling county,” per either the Wisconsin or Federal Compact,252 and the 
Village lies entirely within the watershed.253  However, these boundaries only 
became effective on April 24, 2015, and before their enactment, Somers was a 
municipality to which any new diversions would have been subject to Compact 
diversion procedures.254
Though nominally different, the two municipal entities remain largely one-
in-the-same.255  For example, at the time of reincorporation, the Town and Vil-
lage were set to “develop [another] intergovernmental agreement that provides 
specifics regarding future service sharing (fire & rescue, public works including 
sewer and water utilities, garbage and recycling, employees, etc.), regulatory 
control, and municipal boundaries, among other issues that will arise between 
the Town and Village.”256  Of these shared services, the shared sewer and water 
utilities ultimately came from the City of Kenosha.257  While the “Town of 
Somers Water Utility purchases water on a wholesale basis from the City of 
Kenosha,” “the Village located along the Lake Michigan shoreline [is] served 
directly [by] the Kenosha Water Utility.”258  Notably, some Town of Somers 
residents receive water from individual wells, implying that the Kenosha water 
utility service is not the only practicable means of supplying water.259  Outside 
of individual wells, the two municipal entities receive 31 million gallons of 
Lake Michigan water per year from Kenosha.260  This sum may require Com-
pact compliance; however, the incorporation of the Village effectively rendered 
Somers representing about 2,627 people and most of the physical acreage some 16-square miles.”  Jon 
Brines, Election comes down to 1 vote: Small turnout as Somers Village Board, president elected,
KENOSHA NOW, July 9, 2015, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/elec-
tion_comes_down_to_1_vote_483032328.php.
251. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250. 
252. See supra Part II; see also WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(d) and (t) (2013–2014); Federal Com-
pact, supra note 7, § 1.2
253. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250.
254. VILLAGE OF SOMERS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, supra note 249. 
255. Incorporation: Impact on Services: Shared Service Agreements, THE VILLAGE AND TOWN
OF SOMERS, http://www.somers.org/?q=print/112 [https://perma.cc/P896-ANHB] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017).
256. Id.
257. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250. 
258. Id.
259. Id.  Whether Village residents receive water from individual wells is unclear. 
260. Id.; see generally WIS. STAT. § 281.346(3)(a)1 (2013–2014) (“Any person who proposes to 
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such compliance inapplicable.261  The Town, on the other hand, may lack cer-
tain Compact requirements.262
B. The Implications of the Incorporation 
The incorporation of the Town and Village events circumnavigated the 
Compact’s procedures and effectively prove the existence of unregulated diver-
sions.263  The reincorporation of the Village of Somers rendered it completely 
independent of the landlocked Town of Somers.264  The secondary effect of the 
reincorporation was to make the Village Compact-compliant as it now lies en-
tirely within the basin and automatically is exempt from diversion request pro-
cedures.265  Such gerrymandering of municipal boundaries is not barred by the 
Compact at either a state or federal level.266  The Wisconsin Compact at section 
281.346(2)(d) provides that a “county’s boundaries as of December 13, 2005, 
shall be used to determine whether a county lies partly within the Great Lakes 
basin.”267  No similar provision exists to permanently establish municipal or 
“community” boundaries, and indeed it seems unmanageable to restrict towns, 
cities, or the equivalent thereof from expanding their boundaries to service cit-
izens as they grow in population.268  This implies that Waukesha too could have 
reincorporated either (a) to annex and thus include the municipalities that re-
ceived its water services or, though admittedly implausibly, (b) to reincorporate 
and include portions of land that extended over the basin divide to effectively 
make itself more diversion-eligible.269
This secondary effect is not to be understated for two reasons.  Firstly, in 
begin a withdrawal from the waters of the state using a water supply system that will have the capacity 
to withdraw an average of 100,000 gallons per day or more in any 30-day period, to increase the ca-
pacity of a water supply system so that it will have the capacity to withdraw an average of 100,000 
gallons per day or more in any 30-day period, or to begin a diversion shall register the withdrawal or 
diversion with the department.”). 
261. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3; WIS. STAT. § 281.346(3)(a)1. 
262. Infra Section V.B. 
263. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
264. See supra Figure 5; VILLAGE OF SOMERS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, supra note 
249.
265. See supra Figure 5.
266. See generally Federal Compact, supra note 7; WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2013–2014).
267. Id. § 281.346(2)(d) (2013–2014).
268. See id. § 281.343(1e)(t) (“‘Straddling community’ means any incorporated city, town, or 
the equivalent thereof, wholly within any county that lies partly or completely within the basin, whose 
corporate boundary existing as of the effective date of this compact is partly within the basin or partly 
within 2 Great Lakes watersheds.”). 
269. The City of Waukesha is a poor example of a town that could incorporate a portion of land 
outside the basin to render itself compact compliant because it is quite far from the basin divide and it 
already satisfies another compact exception. See supra Section IV. 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 188 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 188 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
WABISZEWSKI-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 12:34 PM
662 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:627 
rendering the Village compliant, the Somers municipalities saved their taxpay-
ers significant time, money, and outside resources.270  Where Somers spent 
about a year getting Lake Michigan water to the industrial complex develop-
ment, Waukesha spent over twenty years and millions of dollars on researching, 
developing, and eventually lobbying for a Compact Diversion.271  Secondly, 
and more pointedly, the incorporation of the Town and Village reveal a means 
to circumnavigate the Compact through annexation or reincorporation of other 
towns, cities, or the equivalent thereof.272
While the Village was made Compact-compliant, the Town was not ren-
dered so fortunate.273  As it remained a “straddling community,” any new or 
increased diversions to it would be subject to a diversion proposal and subse-
quent approval by the Council according the exception standard, “regardless of 
the volume of water transferred.”274  As previously mentioned, the expense of 
such a process is incredible; however, both process and expenses imposed by 
the Compact were avoided by the enactment of Item 66.275
C. Enacting Item 66 
Further damage to the Compact’s potency occurred in June of 2015 “during
a secretive, last-minute stage of the budget process,”276 wherein the Wisconsin 
Legislature passed and the Governor Scott Walker signed Item 66.277  Enact-
ment of Item 66 was prompted by the development of the industrial site along 
Highways H and S.278  During the development planning stages, Kenosha ini-
tially offered to provide the site with water and sewage services in exchange 
for the annexation of the area to supplement those areas which were to be an-
nexed in accordance with the Cooperative Plan between the Town and City.279
However, Somers refused and Kenosha in turn denied the extension of water 
270. As Representative Samantha Kerkman of Salem put it, “Somers doesn’t have to run laterals 
from other places.  It will save taxpayers millions of dollars.”  Brines Kreuser, supra note 227.
271. See Supra Section V.A.  
272. See generally Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
273. See generally Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250. 
274. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a) (2013–2014).
275. Infra Section V.C. 
276. Brines Kreuser, supra note 227. 
277. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015). 
278. Kobza, supra note 229, § 3 (“An existing water and sewer agreement between Kenosha and 
Somers requires Kenosha to provide water and sewer service anywhere in Somers provided service is 
taken at certain specified master-meter locations. However, there apparently was interest from a de-
veloper or property-owner in the Town of Somers in obtaining service at a different location. Rather 
than seeking to negotiate a revision to the existing water and sewer agreement to allow service at this 
other location, legislation was sought and obtained to override the agreement.”). 
279. See Brines, supra note 198; see also Cooperative Plan, supra note 243, § 19.
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utility services to the new development.280  Shortly after this refusal, Item 66 
became law.281
Applying exclusively to Kenosha County,282 Item 66 ultimately limits Ke-
nosha County’s ability to deny the extension of municipal water access to 
neighboring municipalities.283  The statute provides that these neighboring mu-
nicipalities
may request the extension of water or sewer service from an-
other municipality in that county that owns and operates a wa-
ter or sewer utility if the request for service is for an area that, 
on the date of the request, does not receive water or sewer ser-
vice from any public utility or municipality and the municipal-
ity requesting the service contains an area that, on the date of 
the request, receives water or sewer service from the water or 
sewer utility owned and operated by the other municipality.284
The neighboring municipalities’ ability to demand water service is an in-
credibly powerful one, while Kenosha’s ability to limit service is extremely 
confined.285  The only means by which Kenosha may deny service is if “the
utility does not have sufficient capacity to serve the area that is the subject of 
the request or if the request would have a significant adverse effect on the util-
ity.”286
Since Kenosha draws its waters from Lake Michigan,287 the supply is vir-
tually unlimited and unencumbered, and thus a denial of an extension to its 
neighbors under a claim of incapacity seems virtually unavailable.288  More 
likely is a claim that the Kenosha water utility suffers a significant adverse im-
pact in complying with Item 66, because in so doing it violates the Compact.289
The Town, as a straddling community, is required to follow the diversion pro-
cedures when any newly proposed diversion to it would result in withdrawals 
280. See Brines Kreuser, supra note 227. 
281. Id.
282. Id.  Although the statute did not specifically mention Kenosha County, as Kenosha is the 
only “county bordered by Lake Michigan and the state of Illinois,” the implication that the legislature 
refers to Kenosha County cannot be refuted. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m)(b).
283. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m); Brines Kreuser, supra note 227 (“‘The city of Ke-
nosha holds a lot of the cards over the years and this levels the playing field,’ [Representative Saman-
tha] Kerkman said.  ‘Somers doesn’t have to run laterals from other places.  It will save taxpayers 
millions of dollars.’”). 
284. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m)(b). 
285. See generally id.
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. KENOSHA, WIS., ORDINANCE NO. 28-10, Comprehensive Plan for the City of Kenosha: 
2035, supra note 240, § 3. 
288. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 244. 
289. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n) (2013–2014); see generally Kobza supra note 229, § 3. 
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in excess of 100,000 gallons a day.290  The Town and the Village already use 
31 million gallons of water a year from the Kenosha Water Utility.291  It thus is 
reasonable to assume that the increased diversions to the Town for the industrial 
development would likely use a supply in excess of the 100,000-gallon-per-day 
minimum.  Since no compliance with the Compact procedures has been imple-
mented, Somers and the Kenosha water utility are in violation of its require-
ments.292  Violations of the compact could result in a hearing before the Council 
or even litigation.293  The impending litigation to be contemplated in the GLSL 
Cities Initiative hearing before the Council is an example of the Compact’s con-
flict resolution procedures in action and in effect poses a significant adverse 
impact for the parties involved in terms of liability and litigation expenses.294
However, this liability and the attendant adverse impact are uncertain.295
The Town and Village could counter by claiming that their payment for services 
balances out the adverse impact of diversions—though this is a weak claim; 
payment does not dispel litigation.  Regardless of these claims, Item 66 never-
theless weighs heavily in favor of granting requests, and although it sets up 
measures for Kenosha to deny these requests, these measures are untested and 
thus uncertain.296
Before being passed into law, Item 66 was met with strong opposition by 
not just the Kenosha County municipal water utility, but also by numerous wa-
ter protection groups and municipal support groups.297  In a memorandum to 
the Wisconsin State Legislature, the Wisconsin Rural Water Association, 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities, Municipal Environmental Group-Water, 
and Wisconsin Water Association, as representatives of “virtually every com-
munity, water, and wastewater utility in the state of Wisconsin” vehemently 
urged the legislature to reject Item 66.298  They argued that granting “one mu-
nicipality [the power] to in essence force another municipality to extend water 
and sewer services is ill-conceived, short-sighted public policy that will have 
290. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(2).
291. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250. 
292. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(2).
293. See WIS. STAT. § 281.93 (2013–2014); see also WIS. STAT. § 281.95 (2013–2014). 
294. Request for Hearing Letter, Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, supra note 127. 
295. See generally Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, et. all to Members, 
Wisconsin Legislature, Remove Budget Provision on Extension of Water and Sewer Service between 
Municipalities (July 6, 2015), http://www.lwm-info.org/DocumentCenter/View/45
[https://perma.cc/RF9A-ECJC]; Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
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significant adverse financial, health and other impacts.”299  Imperatively, “pro-
vision 66 supersedes any ordinance or agreement relating to shared services 
currently in effect, thereby, preempting previously negotiated boundary agree-
ments and water and sewer agreements.”300
Before Item 66 was even signed into effect, the Kenosha Board of Water 
Commissioners put to vote whether or not to be governed by the soon to be 
enacted legislation.301  In a charter issued before the City Council by the Mayor 
of the City of Kenosha on February 16, 2015, the Council unanimously voted 
not to be governed by the provisions of Item 66 and thereby established limits 
on the city’s delivery of water services to neighboring municipalities.302  This 
motion seems to place Item 66 in the position of a paper tiger, much like the 
Charter, although the ability of a municipality to refuse to follow state law is 
uncertain.
D. The Implications of Item 66 
The codification of Item 66 at section 66.0813(5m) gives it the teeth the 
Charter lacked and expands its implications beyond the boundaries of Ke-
nosha.303  Where many items that pass through the budget do not have the force 
of law, by codifying Item 66, the Wisconsin legislature essentially provided 
Somers a cause of action and enforcement power should Kenosha refuse to 
abide by it.304  Additionally, it opened the possibility of Item 66 being scrubbed 
of its geographical limits and expanding its reach to other communities.305  A 
further possibility remains that similar legislation could be passed in other basin 
states permitting Great Lakes water to be serviced to communities outside the 
basin.306  These possibilities echo the spirit of the Wisconsin Rural Water As-
sociation memorandum, which urged that Item 66 could have far-reaching con-
sequences if approved.307
Like the precedential impact of the permitting of the Waukesha diversion, 
the precedential value of Item 66’s enactment broaches a variety of issues.308
299. Id.
300. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
301. Meeting Minutes from Board of Water Commissioners Meeting, supra note 226.
302. Id.  The charter was moved by Commissioner Juliana, seconded by Commissioner Gordon 
to approve, and subsequently passed by a 5–0 vote. Id.
303. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015).  
304. See generally WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m); Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water 
Association, supra note 295. 
305. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295. 
306. Id.; see Kobza, supra note 229, § 3; Strifling, Waukesha and Racine Mayors Stake Out Op-
posing Positions, supra note 188. 
307. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295. 
308. Id.
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 190 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 190 Side B      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
WABISZEWSKI-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 12:34 PM
666 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:627 
First and foremost, if the terms of a negotiated agreement between two govern-
mental bodies can be so easily overridden by legislation, the binding nature and 
magnitude of all intergovernmental agreements, here particularly the Great 
Lakes Compact, is called into question.309  Second, the Council’s interpretation 
of “community” and Approved Diversion Area—meaning the limited areas of 
the City of Waukesha and its town islands—does not altogether bar Waukesha’s 
entire service area from access to Great Lakes water.310  As Item 66 demon-
strates, a town in a straddling community, and thus requiring compact adher-
ence, can nevertheless lobby its legislature and demand access to Great Lakes 
water from its suppliers.311  Thus, if such legislation were to be passed regarding 
Waukesha, the neighboring municipalities of Pewaukee, Genesee, Delafield, 
and the Town of Waukesha, to which Waukesha provides water services, could 
access the Great Lakes Water.312  Third, the incorporation acted as a sort of 
utility service area redistricting akin to the much-litigated issue of legislative 
redistricting and showed that towns outside the basin, like the Town of Somers, 
can easily get Great Lakes water.313
Finally, although the Compact makes exceptions from the diversion prohi-
bition for preexisting diversions, it does not afford the same courtesy to newly 
created diversions through legislative mandate.314  Thus, new diversions ap-
proved by Item 66 would nevertheless require Compact compliance.315  As 
these steps have not been contemplated by the Town of Somers, nor even by 
the City of Kenosha, it appears again that Item 66 has supplanted the Compact’s 
rigorous procedural requirements. 
For these reasons, it seems that Item 66 is in serious jeopardy of both vio-
lating the Compact and subjecting it to startling vulnerability.316
E. The Limits of these Implications 
As explained above, the incorporation of the Town and Village of Somers 
and Item 66 circumvent the Compact as they each allow a diversion to a com-
munity outside the basin.317  Per the Wisconsin and the Federal Compact, “[a]ll 
309. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
310. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5)(5b)(ii). 
311. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
312. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295. 
313. See generally Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II. 
314. See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (2013–2014). 
315. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n). 
316. See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n). 
317. See supra Section V.D.  
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new or increased diversions are prohibited.”318  A “[n]ew or increased diver-
sion” means a new diversion, an increase in an existing diversion, or the alter-
ation of an existing withdrawal so that it becomes a diversion.”319  The measures 
undertaken in Somers increased an existing diversion of Great Lakes water and 
at least in theory should subject the Town to Compact procedures.320
However, implications from the approval of Waukesha’s diversion could 
potentially limit the potency of such observations on Kenosha’s water woes.321
The Town of Somers, although entirely outside of the basin, nevertheless could 
in theory successfully apply for a diversion pursuant to the requirements of a 
community in a straddling county.322  And if it does so successfully, it could be 
afforded access to Lake Michigan water no matter the objections of the City of 
Kenosha, thus rendering these observations moot.323  It is also entirely possible 
that the Town would not need a diversion permit if its newly proposed water 
use would not exceed 100,000 gallons a day.324
Additionally, unlike Waukesha, Kenosha has no foreseeable need to supply 
neighboring municipalities—the sole exception being the Town of Somers.325
Perhaps the legislature in some way saw Item 66 as a remedial measure for a 
small town that could not otherwise afford to provide its citizens with the infra-
structure they deserved.326  In approving Item 66, the legislature granted a small 
exception, and thus it may be unlikely that Item 66 would ever apply to other 
Wisconsin communities.327
All these limitations on this Comment’s argument could give back to the 
Compact the influence it very rightly deserves.328  Yet the limitations are only 
potential ones, and the very existence of this Comment shows the reality of the 
Compact’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities.  At the very least, the implications 
of a town that straddles the basin divide accessing the waters without Compact 
Council approval should give any water conservationist or legal expert—or in-
deed any resident of the Great Lakes region—pause.329
318. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m). See Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 3.8. 
319. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(km). 
320. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4h). 
321. See supra Section V.A.  
322. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a).
323. However, such an option comes at a considerably greater expense to Somers, which would 
be responsible for the water management and the return flow.  As such, the option is both unattractive 
and unlikely. 
324. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(2).
325. See generally Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
326. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295. 
327. Id.
328. See supra Sections IV, V.  
329. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
While “the Waukesha case has been a striking demonstration that the pro-
cess set up under the Compact works, no matter what one’s position on the 
outcome,” the water diversions into Somers equally demonstrates that the Com-
pact is not universally applied where necessary.330  Indeed, in its apparent dis-
regard for intergovernmental agreements, Item 66 seriously calls into question 
the binding nature of the Great Lakes Compact.331  Couple Item 66’s success in 
diverting Compact procedure with Waukesha’s precedential success in the is-
suance of a Compact diversion, and the United States could face an unprece-
dented threat to the environmental sanctity and the economic vitality of the 
Great Lakes region.332  While one such diversion is seemingly inconsequential, 
the refreshed potential to send water outside the basin is nevertheless discon-
certing.333
While Waukesha’s immediate water woes likely will be solved by the 2016 
diversion, the Approval Decision’s vagueness leaves uncertain certain stand-
ards required for a diversion.334  Equally uncertain is the immediate future for 
Kenosha’s ability to limit water service.335  Additionally and in general, issues 
remain regarding whether in approving the diversion the Wisconsin DNR vio-
lated its duties as trustee under the public trust doctrine, a doctrine which re-
quires that the state preserve for its people the quality and quantity of water 
available.336  Similar issues are unresolved about whether granting to a munic-
ipality power over a large chunk of water is a similar abdication of the public 
trust.337  Finally, the application of federal preemption principals remains un-
tested.338
As this Comment discussed, the historic weakness of federal water protec-
tion measures, the approval of the Waukesha diversion, and ultimately the Wis-
consin legislature’s circumvention around the Compact all show that while the 
Great Lakes Compact is progressive step, it remains a weak protection for the 
330. Strifling, Waukesha Diversion Approved, supra note 121.
331. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3. 
332. The Great Lakes region’s economy “is a $2 trillion juggernaut.”  ANNIN, supra note 11, at 
53.
333. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
334. Supra Section IV.B.  
335. Supra Section V.
336. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 416 n.4 (“Wisconsin’s parallel enactment of Compact, in-
cluding provisions that nothing in Wisconsin’s enactment of the Compact ‘may be interpreted to 
change the application of the public trust doctrine under article IX, section 1, of the Wisconsin Consti-
tution or to create any new public trust rights.’ Wis. Stat. § 281.343(1).”). 
337. See, e.g., Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View 
into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 156 (2012).
338. Supra Section IV.B.  
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county’s most obvious, though least appreciated resource.339 It is notable that 
in a 2016 survey conducted by the Marquette University Law School Poll, only 
fourteen percent of participants had ever heard of a contamination issue in their 
communities, and only forty-one percent expressed any level of concern about 
water safety in their communities.340  These statistics seem to show, if not a lack 
of concern, at least a lack of understanding about the source from which an 
individual’s water is derived.  At the conclusion of all these observations, one 
can turn again to David Foster Wallace’s fish allegory and “wonder if we’re 
like David Foster Wallace’s fish: surrounded by water, yet somehow unable to 
appreciate its existence.”341
CHRISTINA L. WABISZEWSKI*
339. Supra Sections IV, V.  
340. Charles Franklin, Professor of Law and Public Policy and Director of the Marquette Law 
School Poll, Marq. Univ. L. Sch., Address at Public Policy and American Drinking Water Conference: 
Public Perceptions of Drinking Water Contamination 5:10:52 (Sept. 7, 2016). 
341. Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, Lecture, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 750 (2014). 
 * J.D., 2017, Marquette University Law School; B.A., 2013, Marquette University. This article 
is for my father, whose decency, humility, faith and character have made me the person I am to-
day.  Without him, this article would never have been written. Thank you, dad. 
